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Abstract—We introduce a lightweight architecture of Intrusion
Detection Systems (IDS) for ad-hoc IoT networks. Current state-
of-the-art IDS have been designed based on assumptions holding
from conventional computer networks, and therefore, do not
properly address the nature of IoT networks. In this work,
we first identify the correlation between the communication
overheads and the placement of an IDS (as captured by proper
placement of active IDS agents in the network). We model such
networks as Random Geometric Graphs. We then introduce a
novel IDS architectural approach by having only a minimum
subset of the nodes acting as IDS agents. These nodes are able to
monitor the network and detect attacks at the networking layer in
a collaborative manner by monitoring 1-hop network information
provided by routing protocols such as RPL. Conducted experi-
ments show that our proposed IDS architecture is resilient and
robust against frequent topology changes due to node failures.
Our detailed experimental evaluation demonstrates significant
performance gains in terms of communication overhead and
energy dissipation while maintaining high detection rates.
I. INTRODUCTION
Internet of Things is an emerging networking paradigm
enabling computers and people, things and machines to seam-
lessly exchange information and data over the Internet. By
2025 around 55 billion IoT devices will be deployed and more
than 15 USD trillion will be invested in IoT in aggregate
between 2017 and 2025 [1]. IoT is already being deployed
in many critical settings and environments such as healthcare,
manufacturing, critical infrastructure [2], and so forth. IoT in
the modern economy has been targeted by malicious actors due
to the lack of security measures. A representative example is
that of the Mirai botnet [3] or the incident where hackers were
able to take over and control the steering and braking systems
of a Jeep car [4].
Cyber security controls can be clustered in three layers.
The first layer consists of preventive countermeasures such as
authentication and access control mechanisms, cryptography
, firewalls, etc. The second layer (also known as the second
line of defence) consider detection countermeasures that are
engaged during an attack, such as Intrusion Detection Systems.
Finally, at the last layer lie recovery measures and processes
for post-incident management, such as security information
incident management and digital forensics. Due to the inherent
and particular characteristics of IoT (i.e. highly constrained
devices, deployed in big numbers with ephemeral availability),
the corresponding cyber security measures need to be revisited.
In the domain of Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) for
IoT environments, a considerable body of research exists on
deployment architectures, detection strategies and algorithms.
However, available IDS in IoT are designed based on as-
sumptions holding from “conventional” computer networks,
e.g. that each node of the network is assumed to be powerful
in terms of resources (available energy, memory, CPU, etc.).
They are also assumed to be always available and the nodes
to communicate over a reliable and high-capacity network. An
IDS that efficiently addresses the IoT paradigm is needed.
A wireless sensor actuator network (WSAN) consists of a
set of nodes, called sensors, deployed over an area of interest.
The devices communicate over the air with their peers, collab-
oratively carrying out complex tasks. WSNs are a key enabling
technology for the IoT and as such share several common
characteristics. Therefore, WSNs have provided an ideal R&D
platform for several IoT protocols and technologies, such as
CoAP and 6LoWPAN [5].
Our contribution. We introduce a hybrid IDS architecture
for IoT networks that consists of centralized and distributed
IDS agents integrated with a novel placement strategy. In our
approach, the IDS architecture can detect and mitigate the
effect of node failures. Firstly, we model a WSN with the use
of Random Geometric Graphs (RGG). The RGG model can
formally express the spatial characteristics of the network such
as network connectivity, by capturing the inter-dependencies
and the existence of wireless links among neighbouring nodes.
Then, motivated by how IoT networking protocols, such as
RPL, manage and operate the network, we identify the trade-
offs between the communication overheads introduced by an
IDS and its detection rate of attacks such as the sinkhole
attack. We investigate this trade-off via extended emulations
and show that it is not necessary for all nodes to act as IDS
agents. Furthermore, we show that the proposed architecture is
able to efficiently cope with and mitigate the effects of nodes
failures on the the efficiency of the IDS.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2
presents the current state-of-the-art with a special emphasis
on the most important contributions in Intrusion Detection
Systems in WSNs. Sections 3 and 4 introduce the proposed
network model and adopted IDS architecture based on Ran-
dom Geometric Graphs. Section 5 presents the performance
evaluation of the proposed approach and discusses the simu-
lation results and findings. Finally, conclusions are discussed
in Section 6.
II. RELATED WORK
Over the past few years, Intrusion Detection Systems for
WSNs and the IoT have attracted significant research interest.
IDSs can be classified based on their architecture, namely
centralised, distributed or hybrid. In centralized IDSs, the de-
tection algorithms are executed and performed on a designated
node (host). The necessary monitoring and detection data have
to be reported to a centrally located base station which is
assumed to be powerful in terms of processing capabilities
and available memory and energy. In a distributed architecture
on the other hand, each individual network node runs an IDS
agent cooperatively with other agents in the network. Finally,
hybrid IDS architectures demonstrate a combination of the
centralised and distributed architectures in an effort to avoid
the disadvantages of each individual approach.
In [6], the authors proposed a detection method for WSNs
that integrates with intrusion prevention system. In this ap-
proach, symmetric encryption and oneway hash function have
been used to construct the routing path between the BSs and
nodes. Their results showed that the total amount of required
energy can be reduced. However, the use of symmetric key
increases the computation overheads. In [7], the authors pro-
posed an intrusion detection system for IoT named Kalis.
Kalis is placed at the border router to collect features of the
network and use these to dynamically configure appropriate
detection techniques. The authors claim that this approach can
be applied and extended to new protocols as it is independent
of the detection method.
In [8], the authors proposed a centralised intrusion detection
system for IoT. They introduced Complex Event-Processing
(CEP) techniques to monitor network packets that is placed
at the router border. The experimental results reveal that their
approach yields increases in the computation overheads but
consumes less memory compared to traditional IDS.
In [9], the authors proposed a distributed anomaly de-
tection method for WSNs that uses in-network hierarchical
processing. The nodes of the network are first clustered using
fuzzy c-means clustering, and then run an incremental model
to score local and global outliers. The results showed that
this distributed method can achieve high detection accuracy
and smaller computational communication overheads. In [10],
authors proposed a segment-based anomaly detection method
to detect anomalies in WSNs. This algorithm has combined the
Distributed Segment-Based and KullbackLeibler divergence
measures and distributed the sensor nodes in clusters and each
cluster has cluster head node. This proposed detection method
limited to hierarchical network and my applied for flat network
with additional requirements.
In [11], the authors proposed a distributed signature-based
detection system for IoT. The adopted detection algorithm in
each node matches against conventional attacks signatures in
Snort. Their detection approach may detect attacks faster than
other algorithms, but only detects known conventional attacks.
In [12], the authors introduced an IDS for WSN that follows
a hybrid architecture. Their solution focuses on routing attacks
and consists of a central IDS module (running computation-
ally intensive processes) that runs on the Sink node and a
lightweight distributed agent that is deployed on sensor motes.
The proposed IDS has three main modules: a central module
called mapper, a lightweight intrusion detection module, and
a firewall. The proposed solution shows a good performance
in small networks, but it introduces a massive communication
overhead in larger networks. This is mainly due to the fact
that the lightweight agent is deployed on every single sensor
mote of the network, thus leading to bottleneck phenomena
to emerge around the Sink as the diameter of the network
increases. In [13], the authors proposed a hybrid IDS for
IoT by extending [12]. They extended the detection module
of SVELTE by using ETX (Expected Transmissions) metric
within the detection procedure. Their empirical evaluation re-
vealed that their approach achieved high detection rates. How-
ever, they evaluated their approach in small networks with few
nodes. Further,in [14], the authors proposed a specification-
based intrusion detection system for IoT to detect attacks on
RPL-based networks. Their approach is based on hybrid and
partly distributed architecture that divides the network into
clusters where each cluster has a cluster head. The simulation
results revealed that their approach achieved high detection
rate and low overhead. However, this proposed IDS is limited
to cluster based networks.
The current state-of-the-art on IDSs for WSN and IoT
networks are still resource-intensive, as it is primarily stem-
ming from assumptions holding from conventional computer
networks. Centralised IDS architectures introduce significant
communication overhead to the network as the base station
(or Sink) due to large numbers of requests to and from
the nodes related to IDS data collection. Distributed IDS
architectures rely on the cooperation among the sensor nodes,
thus increasing the communication load as well as energy
dissipation. Lastly, hybrid IDS architectures achieve a better
control and global overview of the network, but currently
available solutions also introduce a significant communication
overhead that increases proportionally to the number of net-
work nodes. Furthermore, the resilience and robustness have
not been studied yet.
In this work we focus on hybrid IDS architectures but we
show that by taking into account the specifics of IoT protocols,
such as the ranking mechanism of RPL, as well as the spatial
characteristics of such networks, the number of required IDS
agents in the network (and therefore the corresponding over-
head) can be greatly reduced while maintaining sufficiently
high detection rates.
III. THE NETWORK MODEL
Internet of Things envisions the massive connection of
embedded systems, smart devices and things over the Internet.
Wireless Sensor & Actuator Networks (WSANs), known as
a key enabling technology for IoT, are found in several IoT
systems. WSANs consist of a number of tiny devices equipped
Fig. 1: The Proposed Architecture
with sensors monitor specific environmental variables (e.g.
ambient luminance, temperature, etc). Each sensor is a fully-
autonomous computing and communication device, character-
ized by its constrained nature in terms of available power
supply, transmission range r, limited processing power and
memory capabilities. In this work we focus our study on
WSANs where the sensors are static and are deployed over
the network area uniformly at random.
The Base Station, also called the Sink, represents the border
gateway device lying on the edge of the WSAN network. It
initiates the self-organisation of the network. The sink node is
assumed to be powerful in terms of computational resources
and capabilities, memory and energy supplies.
In this work, we consider the random placement of the
sensor nodes in the network area by a Random Geometric
Graph (RGG). RGG are constructed by n vertices that are
placed at random in the area of interest [0,1]2. An edge (u, v)
exists iff the Euclidean distance of vertices u and v is at most
r, where r is the radius (wireless communication range) r
of the sensors. RGG represents a realistic model for WSANs
since it captures the extent of the communication structure of
real networks such as the spatial aspects.
Particularly, we consider an area A ⊂ R2 in two dimen-
sional space. An instance of the random geometric graphs
model G(Xn; r) is constructed as follows: for n points Xn
uniformly placed at random in A. The set V = Xn is the
set of vertices of the graph and we connect two vertices
iff their euclidean distance is at most r. For any vertex
v ∈ V we denote by N(v) the set of neighbours of v and
by deg(v) = |N(v)| its degree. Further, we denote by ‖u−v‖
the Euclidean distance between the points corresponding to
vertices v, u. RGG model provides us with a formal tool of
constructing and characterising networks as ”sparse”, ”dense”
or ”normal”.
IV. THE PROPOSED IDS
We propose a hybrid architecture of an Architecture In-
trusion Detection System that consists of a central detection
agent located in the base station and a distributed lightweight
intrusion detection agent deployed on a subset of the network
nodes as shown in Figure 1. The central IDS controls the entire
IDS architecture and relevant data from the distributed agents.
Each network node that runs an instance of the distributed
agent, monitors and collects data on local network activity
from its 1-hop neighbouring nodes. This implies that not
all nodes need to run the IDS agent, but only a subset of
them such that every node in the network has at least one 1-
hop neighbour operating as IDS agent. In graph theory, such
a subset is defined as a vertex cover of the corresponding
RGG graph that captures the structure of the network. In our
approach (algorithm 1), the subset of the nodes that act as IDS
agents is selected based on the Vertex-cover algorithm [15]
(greedy algorithm) to find a subset of minimum cardinality
with proper placement. Moreover, we propose a method to
maintain and monitor the distributed IDS agents against node
failures. As shown in Algorithm 1, the central IDS frequently
checks the set of IDS agents against node failures. In case any
of the IDS nodes fail to communicate with the central IDS,
the central IDS agent will re-run our proposed algorithm to
select a new subset of the nodes to act as IDS agents.
Algorithm 1 Detect Sinkhole Attacks
Require: N ← the list of nodes
Require: S ←the list of neighbour nodes
Require: A ← the list of selected Node to run as an IDS
agent
Require: A′ ← A
1: while A = ∅ OR A 6= A′ do
2: while N 6= ∅ do
3: Select a set of neighbours ∈ S that maximise S ∩
N
4: N ← N − S








10: for Node in A do
11: for Node in S do
12: if (Node.Rank+IDSagentNodeRank





18: for Node in N do




We apply our aforementioned approach by extending the
state of the art IDS for WSN by Raza et al. called SVELTE
[12]. In SVELTE, authors consider multi-hop peer-to-peer
IPv6-enabled WSNs running the 6LoWPAN stack [5] on
ContikiOS [16]. They develop a hybrid IDS architecture that
consists of a centralized module running on the Sink and a
distributed agent running on each individual sensor node. The
centralized module contains the 6LoWPAN Mapper (6Mapper)
which gathers information from the sensor nodes on the
network topology. In particular, 6Mapper collects information
on the rank assigned to each node by the RPL protocol which
is closely related to the hop distance of each node from
the Sink. This allows IDS agents to monitor their imme-
diate neighbouring nodes against anomalies. For instance, a
sinkhole attack could be performed by having malicious or
compromised nodes falsely announcing to their neighbours a
significantly lower rank than the actual one. Thus, all network
traffic would go through the malicious node.
RPL establishes and maintains routing paths between the
Sink and the rest of the network nodes by constructing a
global network topolog using the Destination Oriented Di-
rected Acyclic Graph (DODAG). The Sink initially broadcasts
exploratory messages to its immediate neighbouring nodes,
which in turn reiterate the process to their neighbouring
nodes lying further away in the network. The process is run
recursively and eventually results in each node being assigned
a rank that depends on its actual hop-distance to the Sink
as well as the link quality between neighbouring nodes (as
measured by an objective function, such as the ETX metric).
In SVELTE, the 6Mapper periodically collects these ranks
to reconstruct the DODAG centrally at the Sink in order to
monitor the network against relevant attacks - like sinkhole -
by detecting corresponding anomalies as shown in Algorithm
1; for example, if the rank of a node significantly deviates
from the rank of its neighbours.
While each individual node introduces a small communi-
cation overhead (6Mapper requests are 5 bytes long while
each response from the nodes is 17 bytes long), engaging all
nodes in the process introduces a significant communication
overhead that is proportional to the size of the network. This
poses significant scalability issues and adversely affects the
connectivity and availability of the network as in multi-hop
peer-to-peer networks nodes closer to the Sink also serve
traffic coming from the rest of the network.
The main idea of our approach is that networking protocols
designed to address the distributed ad-hoc nature of IoT
networks use local network information available to the nodes
such as RPL. This network information can be monitored
by 1-hop neighbouring nodes. Therefore, for a given set of
neighbouring nodes it suffices that only one of them is actively
collecting and reporting relevant information to the Sink. This
greatly reduces the number of nodes that need to operate as
IDS agents, thus mitigating any scalability and performance
issues.
In this work we focus on experimentally evaluating our
approach on SVELTE as a representative example of a hybrid
IDS architecture for ad-hoc networks. Particularly, we evaluate
the trade-off between the potentially reduced overhead of
the IDS and potential drop in the detection rate (due to the
lower number of active IDS agents in the network) versus
the reduced communication overheads and increased energy
efficiency of the network. We also evaluate the resilience




We ran our experiments in two parts. Firstly, we evaluate
the efficiency and effectiveness of our proposed approach.
Then, we study the resilience and redundancy of the proposed
architecture. For both experiments we use Cooja [17], which
provides a detailed cross-layer simulation for WSNs running
the 6LoWPAN stack. We consider three qualitatively distinct
network densities as these are indicated by the Random Geo-
metric Graph model. Particularly, we consider a network area
A = [0, 100]2 where n sensor motes are deployed uniformly
at random, for n ∈ {32, 64, 128}. We get three network set
ups where r is (a) almost equal to; (b) ×1.5 and (c)×2 the
connectivity threshold, thus resulting in (a) sparse, (b) normal
and (c) dense networks.
For each network density, we consider our approach algo-
rithm 1 where the nodes acting as IDS agents selected based on
cover set algorithm,namely, greedy algorithm. With each case
we set 10% of the node population to act as malicious nodes
deploying sinkhole attacks by exploiting the rank mechanism
of RPL. Any remaining nodes are regular nodes. Furthermore,
in the second part of our experiment we gradually drop off
some nodes that perform IDS agent during the simulation to
evaluate the redundancy of our approach.
For each network configuration we also run a scenario
with no nodes operating as IDS nodes. For each scenario we
create 10 random instances of the network; this allows us to
effectively mitigate in our simulations any issues that might
occur due to the random network topology (in other words
we sample the space of RGG instances). For each instance
we run 10 iterations of simulating the network operation for
a simulation time of 3600 seconds where nodes generate and
transmit data approximately every second. For each scenario
and each performance metric we compute average values and
95% confidence intervals.
B. Evaluation Metrics
In the following subsections we define the metrics that are
used to evaluate our proposed IDS architecture.
1) Detection Rate: We define the detection rate as the
number of true positive detections of malicious nodes over
the total number of malicious nodes in the network.
Detection rate =
number of true positive detections
total number of malicious nodes
(1)
2) Communication Overhead: We define the communica-
tion overhead as the additional volume of data communication
introduced in the network as a result of the operation of the
IDS. We follow the practise of [12] and monitor this metric
only to the 1-hop neighbouring nodes of the Sink (the rationale
is that any network traffic will have to go through these nodes
prior to reaching the Sink). We denote by EIDS the energy
consumption of the said nodes with the IDS running and with
EIDS the energy consumption of the said nodes with no IDS
running in the network. Then,
(a) Sparse network (b) Normal density network (c) Dense network
Fig. 2: IDS detection rate
(a) Sparse network (b) Normal density network (c) Dense network
Fig. 3: Energy consumption and communication overhead
for the entire network
(a) Sparse network (b) Normal network (c) Dense network





3) Total Energy Consumption in the Network: We measure
the total energy consumption ∆Etotal in the network as the
difference between the total available energy in the network at
the beginning of a simulation and at the end. We denote initial
available energy for sensor i by Eiinit and the initial available







Figure 2 shows that in all network densities the average of
detection rate where the subset of the node population operates
as an IDS agent selected by our approach that uses cover
set (greedy algorithm) remains high, around 80%. Also, the
detection rate in random placement of distributed IDS agents
(a) Sparse network (b) Normal density network (c) Dense network
Fig. 5: Detection rate over IDS agent node failure
(a) Sparse network (b) Normal density network (c) Dense network
Fig. 6: Detection rate after IDS agents failure recovery
(a) Sparse network (b) Normal density network (c) Dense network
Fig. 7: Energy consumption and communication overhead introduced by the IDS with recovery mechanism
based on connectivity threshold [18] remains as high as 85%.
However, in very rare cases areas of the network remain un-
monitored because of the random placement of IDS agents.
This demonstrates that our approach provides better placement
of distributed IDS architecture since it allows the proper nodes
to perform the IDS agent.
Figures 3 and 4 show that the energy consumption and the
communication overhead introduced to the network by the
IDS is proportional to the number of nodes operating as IDS
agents. This shows that our approach achieved lower com-
munication overhead and energy consumption rate compered
to random placement [18] based on connectivity threshold
where a constant number of nodes performing the IDS agent.
Moreover, figures 2 and 3 show that our approach achieved
high detection rate with lower energy consumption which
reveals that minimal number of nodes were allowed to run
the IDS agent.
At the second part of our experiment, first, we drooped
off gradually and arbitrarily some IDS agent nodes during
the simulation to study the resilience and how that effect the
efficiency of our approach. Figures 5 show that the detection
rate quickly drops due to that areas of the networks when
nodes were drooped off left un-monitored. Then, we evaluated
our algorithm that integrated with our approach that monitors
the health of IDS agents.We also, dropped off gradually and
arbitrary some IDS agent nodes during the simulation. Figure
6 shows that the detection rate remains high even after the
nodes dropping which indicates that our approach provides a
level of resilience against nodes failure.
Figure 7 shows that for all network densities the energy
consumption and the communication overhead introduced to
the network by our proposed algorithm that monitors the
distributed IDS agents against nodes failure. The energy con-
sumption slightly increased after random IDS agents nodes
drooping due to that centralised IDS reallocate the distributed
IDS agents in order to recover the area that left un-monitored.
It is worthwhile the effort that provides the resilience of
distributed IDS architecture against node failures.
This indicates that the energy efficiency and resilience of
hybrid IDS architecture for ad-hoc networks is independent to
the number of nodes acting as IDS agents and their placement.
It suffices that only one of neighbouring nodes monitors and
reports relevant information to the Sink. Thus, it reduces the
number of nodes that are needed to operate as IDS agents.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this work we study efficient and lightweight Intrusion
Detection Systems for ad-hoc networks via the prism of IPv6-
enabled Wireless Actuator Sensor Networks. We first use
Random Geometric Graphs (RGG) that allows to provide a
formal model of WSNs. RGG capture the spatial character-
istics of WSNs as such interdependencies on the existence
of wireless links among neighbouring nodes. We focus on
network attacks in IoT-specific networking protocols such as
sinkhole attack in RPL. We identify the underline cause of
communication overhead in state-of-the-art and try to optimise
the trade-off between energy efficiency of IDS and detection
rate. We propose a novel IDS architecture that requires only
a subset of the nodes with proper placement to efficiently
operate distributed IDS agents.
We integrate our method on the state of the art on IDS for
WSNs and conduct our performance evaluation via extensive
emulations. We consider various network densities as they are
formally defined by RGG model. Experiment results show
that our proposed approach achieved high detection rates with
a subset of the nodes running as IDS agents. The energy
consumption and communication overhead introduced by the
IDS reduced since the energy consumption is proportional to
the number of IDS agents. Furthermore, results show that our
proposed IDS architecture is resilient and robust against node
failures. Centralised IDS monitors the distributed IDS agents
and reallocates a new subset to run as IDS agents whenever
node failure accrues.
In our future work we will employ our method on real-world
network structured instead of random placement of nodes. We
will also work in providing efficient algorithms as balancing
the overhead among all the nodes.
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